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Starting Points 
The concept of poverty traps has achieved some prominence within macro development 
economics to explain the co-existence of groups of national economies that continually grow, 
invest and become prosperous with other groups of economies that stagnate, under-invest and 
remain poor. A parallel concept of livelihood strategies has been developed by a multi-
disciplinary group of development researchers and practitioners to explain the inter-
connections between asset portfolios, multiplex strategies of groups and individuals, and 
outcomes for the welfare of the rural poor. This paper brings together these two concepts and 
draws out implications for applied research, policy and planning. 
 
Background 
At the end of the last decade the global community agreed on the need for concerted action to 
redress the global problems of poverty, malnutrition, poor health, low education, gender 
imbalance and environmental degradation. The first of the eight Millennium Development 
Goals formulated then was to cut by half the percentage of people living on less than $1 per 
day between the year 1990 and 2015. This goal, which even if achieved would still strand 
hundreds of millions of people in persistent poverty, is proving very difficult to achieve in 
many developing countries. Indeed, many countries in Africa have actually experienced 
increased poverty rates and negative per capita income growth since 1990. 
 
The various agencies involved in development assistance and development policy have 
shown an increasing, although still highly variable, concentration on the goal of reducing 
poverty in the world’s poorest countries. Macroeconomists are told to focus on pro-poor 
growth; health agencies are told to give priority to the needs of poor districts; and veterinary 
scientists are told to develop vaccines that will contribute to pro-poor livestock development. 
                                                 
1    This paper draws ideas and some material from Barrett and Swallow (2003). We thank Larry 
Blume, Doug Brown, Michael Carter, Alain de Janvry, Andrew Mude, Ben Okumu and Frank Place 
and participants at the January 2003 conference for helpful discussions. This work was made possible 
in part by grants from the United States Agency for International Development, number LAG-A-00-
96-90016-00 through the BASIS CRSP managed at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and 
through the Strategies and Analyses for Growth with Access cooperative agreement at Cornell 
University. All views, interpretations, recommendations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are 
those of the authors and not necessarily those of the supporting or cooperating organizations.  
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The Future Harvest Centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
articulate their goal in terms of food security, poverty reduction and environmental 
conservation and have begun to explicitly consider poverty reduction in impact assessment 
studies (eg Adato and Meinzen-Dick, 2003). 
  
Framing development assistance in terms of poverty reduction requires conceptual 
frameworks and analytical approaches that truly capture the nature and dimensions of 
poverty, that distinguish the proximal and distal causes and correlates of poverty, and that 
integrate across enterprises, sectors and social-spatial scales. Some progress has been made. 
The World Bank “Voices of the Poor” studies and its World Development Report 2000/1 
made a compelling case for the need to consider poverty in terms of low purchasing power, 
high vulnerability to social, economic and ecological shocks, and lack of voice and 
accountability (Narayan and Petesch, 2002). Improved data, analytical methods and 
communication techniques have led to greatly improved understanding of the spatial 
distribution of poor people and environmental resources, the vulnerability of different 
population groups, the quality of national governance, and the correlates of poverty at 
different scales (Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001; McCay and Lawon, 2003). 
 
Of special interest to those concerned with rural development policy is the analytical focus on 
livelihood strategies, rather than more specific production or marketing strategies. The 
sustainable livelihoods framework depicts the five types of capital that rural residents access 
– physical, social, natural, financial, and human – the policies and institutions that define 
people’s options for using that capital, the livelihood strategies that people use to transform 
assets into income, service and product streams, and the way that income and product streams 
are translated into welfare outcomes (Bebbington, 1999, Scoones 1998, Ellis 2000). The 
sustainable livelihoods framework informs much of the empirical analysis presented in other 
chapters of this volume. 
 
We propose that the livelihoods framework can be further strengthened through more explicit 
conceptual and empirical attention to dynamic poverty traps. The essence of the relation 
between livelihood strategies and dynamic poverty traps can be distilled into four general 
points. First, there is often a clear and shared preference ordering among the multiple 
livelihood strategies that are observed among individuals or households within a particular 
rural population. Second, specific assets often constrain the level of welfare associated with a 
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livelihood strategy. Third, thresholds in the relationships that transform assets into outcomes 
mean that households that accumulate higher stocks of assets are sometimes able to generate 
much higher marginal returns than households that accumulate lower stocks of assets. Fourth, 
systematic imperfections in rural financial markets mean that individuals, households and 
communities commonly need to self-finance most capital accumulation. In this paper we 
develop these points and discuss the implications for analysis and policy.  
 
Theory and evidence on poverty and livelihoods   
The last ten years has witnessed a paradoxical juxtaposition in Africa: worsening poverty 
trends accompanied by greatly improved understanding of poverty and the livelihoods of the 
poor. Some of the key findings about poverty can be summarized into the two key points 
below.  
 
Macro poverty traps are a reality   
As first discussed by the classic development economists such as Gunnar Mydral, Allyn 
Young, and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan in the middle of the last century, there does indeed 
appear to have been a bifurcation of economic progress among the developing countries of 
the world. From relatively similar initial conditions, some developing economies have 
achieved sustained economic progress and accumulation, while others appear to be caught in 
poverty traps of under-investment, low productivity and high poverty. These differences in 
performance cannot be explained by differences in macro-economic policy and governance 
alone. Subsequent analysts have postulated different combinations of conditions that can 
generate such multiple equilibria: (i) increasing returns to scale technologies, often due to 
externalities at the societal level (Romer 1986, Lucas 1988, Azariadis and Drazen 1990, 
Durlauf 1996), (ii) spatial agglomeration economies and resulting market and technological 
effects at the regional level (Krugman 1991, Fujita et al. 1999), (iii) financial market failures 
combined with either indivisibilities in key investments, such as education or livestock 
(Loury 1981, Galor and Zeira 1993, Dercon 1998, Mookherjee and Ray 2002) or, (iv) 
irreversibilities due to subsistence or nutrition thresholds (Zimmerman and Carter 2003, 
Dasgupta 1997). Barrett and Carter (2002) and Easterly (2002) discuss the implications of 
these macro poverty traps for public policy and development assistance programmes.  
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There are strong links between household assets, livelihoods and poverty 
The availability of new sets of household panel data has stimulated several studies of the 
determinants of rural poverty and income in African countries. The results from ten of these 
analyses are summarized in Table 1. The results on assets and income are quite consistent and 
intuitive across the studies. Both livestock assets and agricultural land holdings are strongly 
and positively correlated with income in almost all studies. Primary education is positively 
correlated with income in all countries except those in which average primary education is 
very low (e.g., Mozambique and Ethiopia).  
 
The results on livelihood patterns and income levels are not as consistent. Formal sector 
employment is positively correlated with income in some countries, but is not a viable 
livelihood option in several other countries. While dependence on agriculture is negatively 
correlated with income in some countries, this effect is limited by the small size of land 
holdings in other countries. Jayne et al. (2001) argue that small land holdings in many 
countries limit the viability of agriculture as a livelihood strategy, forcing many small farmers 
to diversify into less profitable livelihood options.   
 
A more detailed analysis of the links between livelihood strategies and income has been 
conducted for Rwanda by Barrett et al. (2001a). Figure 1, which is adapted from that study, 
depicts the cumulative frequency distributions of total income among 1079 households in 
Rwanda, organized into four distinct livelihood strategies. The farm and farm worker (FFW) 
strategy includes households that only work as unskilled agricultural laborers or farm their 
own land. The full-time farmer (FTF) strategy represents households that farmed their own 
land and livestock and had no off-farm employment. The mixed strategy (MIX) includes non-
farm employment with farming and unskilled agricultural labor. Finally, the mixed-skilled 
only (MSO) strategy involves only farming or skilled non-farm labor for a salary or as an 
entrepreneur. As displayed in Figure 1, full time farming (FTF) and especially farm and farm 
worker (FFW) livelihood strategies are stochastically dominated by mixed strategies, 
especially those involving only skilled labor and farming (MSO). No one would choose the 
FFW strategy if they had access to the MIX or MSO strategies. Barriers to entry into higher 
return strategies become evident by revealed preference.  
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Micro-scale poverty traps and livelihoods 
Welfare orderings among distinct livelihood strategies, such as those presented in Figure 1, 
appear to be strongly related to barriers to entry that impede access to more remunerative 
livelihoods by those lacking the necessary financial, human or natural capital to undertake 
these activities (Dercon and Krishnan 1996, Ellis 2000, Barrett, Reardon and Webb 2001). In 
the Rwandan example, full-time farming is only an option for those endowed with enough 
land or livestock to absorb all the adult labor in the household. Skilled non-farm employment 
is only available to those with education, particular skills (e.g., blacksmiths, lorry drivers), or 
the necessary financial capital to start a business. 
 
The general nature of this situation is confirmed by a growing number of studies of 
livelihood, income and asset dynamics. For example, Barrett et al. (2001b) found that among 
rice farming households in Côte d’Ivoire, households with poor initial asset endowments 
were unable to access superior livelihood strategies that bestowed considerable income gains 
following the massive CFA franc exchange rate devaluation of January 1994. Those with 
poor endowments were less able to respond to attractive emerging on-farm and non-farm 
opportunities, while ex ante richer households reaped considerable gains from devaluation 
that was promoted as benefiting small farmers. In Ethiopia, Lybbert et al. (2002) found that 
pastoralists whose livestock herds fall below a threshold of 12-15 head of cattle tend to 
become involuntarily sedentarized because of a minimum necessary scale for successful 
transhumant migration. Dercon (1998) likewise found that initial assets condition the ability 
of Tanzanian agro-pastoralists to accumulate wealth and move out of poverty. And Dercon 
and Krishnan (1996) find that in both Ethiopia and Tanzania, households’ initial asset 
holdings – especially education, marketable skills and capital – are strongly and positively 
related to the likelihood of following the most remunerative livelihood strategies observed in 
their samples.  
 
Together this evidence supports a number of parallels between the macro-level poverty traps 
described above and the micro-level situation of households and individuals in rural Africa. 
First, initial differences in asset holdings can have lasting effects on farm families’ 
livelihoods. At the macro level of national economies the relevant assets include 
communication and transportation infrastructure, water storage and electricity generation 
capacity, the quality of health and education services, the quality of governance and the 
quality of the labour force. At the micro level of households and individual, key assets 
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include livestock, land, farm implements, treadle pumps and education of the family 
members.  
 
Second, asset holdings constrain options available for production and accumulation of more 
assets. At the macro level, whole industries such as telecommunications, finance or tourism 
may be essentially ruled out as avenues for growth and tax generation because of low levels 
of infrastructure or education or due to prohibitively restrictive policies (Romer 1994). At the 
micro level, we know that those with little or no assets or skills are unlikely to be able to 
enter into remunerative nonfarm activities that lead to higher income, higher consumption 
and improved production (Dercon and Krishnan 1996, Barrett, Reardon and Webb 2001). 
Households caught on the wrong end of such traps often end up in a pattern of persistent 
poverty and steady degradation of the natural resource base on which they depend (Shepherd 
and Soule 1998, Coomes and Burt 1997, Coomes et al. 2000, Barrett et al., 2002b). Sufficient 
conditions for the existence of dynamic poverty traps at the household scale are that they 
have incomplete access to financial services (credit or insurance) along with (i) high return 
production or marketing strategies that exhibit a minimum efficient scale of production that is 
beyond the means of the credit-constrained poor (Barrett and Swallow 2003); or (ii) risk and 
subsistence constraints discourage long-term investment in high-return assets among poorer, 
more credit-constrained households (Zimmerman and Carter 2003).  
 
The most extreme cases of micro scale poverty traps involve essentially irreversible human 
capital accumulation failures due to childhood undernutrition, illness and lack of education. 
Perhaps the most compelling models of poverty traps emerge at this micro scale, where 
undernutrition and morbidity early in life can lead to permanent reductions in physical stature 
and health status associated with sharply increased risk of involuntary employment and lower 
incomes in adulthood (Dasgupta 1993, 1997, Strauss and Thomas 1998), and where 
household-scale financial constraints can cause underinvestment in the education of children 
– even those with manifestly high natural ability – thereby propagating poverty across 
generations (Loury 1981). 
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Implications for livelihood studies  
The remainder of this chapter draws out the implications of the presence of dynamic poverty 
traps for livelihood studies and rural development policies.  In this section we explore the 
need to adjust livelihood studies to better consider asset accumulation, livelihood ladders 
linked to those assets, transitions between livelihood strategies, and the strategies that farmers 
take to safeguard their assets against risks. 
 
Asset accumulation and livelihood ladders  
The alternative livelihood strategies pursued by rural residents in a particular area will have 
distinct pathways of accumulation and welfare (i.e., income, expenditures or other measures 
of well-being) and distinct dynamic equilibria at which the strategy reaches a steady state of 
asset stocks and welfare. The steady states of distinct livelihood strategies may co-exist if 
there are asset thresholds that are difficult to surmount through self-finance. For example, the 
steady state for small-scale poultry production may make it difficult to accumulate enough 
assets to move into cattle production. Small differences in initial assets or idiosyncratic (i.e., 
household-specific) asset shocks can mean that some households are able to surmount 
thresholds and move to livelihoods offering higher welfare, while other households are 
unable to do so over extended periods. With several possible livelihoods, this could take the 
appearance of a livelihood ladder that some households are able to climb while others are 
unable to do so. 
 
For example, Moser and Barrett (2003) show that adoption of SRI (a high-yielding, low-input 
rice production method) in Madagascar is positively related to regular off-farm salaried 
employment and to prior adoption of off-season crops (mainly potato, to a lesser degree 
barley under contract farming arrangements with the national brewery) that produce a harvest 
just as the labor-intensive field preparation, planting and transplanting season begins for rice, 
thereby obviating seasonal liquidity constraints that otherwise impede adoption. Floyd et al. 
(2003) found that households in the western hills of Nepal that were more self-sufficient in 
food were more likely to experiment with and ultimately adopt two or more new agricultural 
technologies, with adoption rates among all groups highest for the technologies that are based 
on the existing production system and lowest for technologies based on exotic production 
systems. The small proportion of households who were able to adopt multiple technologies 
reported large improvements in welfare.  
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Analysis of such livelihood ladders requires panel household data on assets, technology 
adoption, incomes and livelihoods, combined with data from communities and local markets 
for interpreting patterns among the households. Research needs to combine quantitative and 
qualitative techniques and to be sensitive to the various ways that households may earn their 
livelihoods and the key types of capital that are necessary for those livelihoods. 
 
Thresholds and asset transitions  
A wide range of thresholds have been identified that affect the livelihoods of rural households 
in Africa. Here we suggest that these may be grouped as follows:  
 
a) Thresholds in agricultural production are consistent with dynamic equilibria in which 
some farmers engage in high investment-high return enterprises while other farmers do not. 
Examples are lumpiness of dairy cattle and oxen, lumpiness of farm implements, increasing 
economies of scale in agro-pastoral livestock production up to minimum levels of production 
(Barrett et al., 2002). 
 
b) Thresholds in nonfarm rural employment are consistent with segmented rural labour 
markets and bifurcated welfare levels in which some families are able to afford to educate 
their children for the skilled labour market while other families are unable to do so. In their 
study in high density areas of Western Kenya, Marenya et al. (2003) found that households 
with high levels of education had higher fertilizer application rates, higher probability of 
owning dairy cattle and tea bushes, had higher maize yields, and earned higher off-farm 
income per day.  
 
c) Thresholds in economies of scope among household livelihood strategies are consistent 
with the successful coupling of agricultural enterprises, such as coffee and dairy cattle in 
Kenya, and with high correlations between level of income and particular combinations of 
income sources. This is different from diversification per se. Other chapters in this volume 
show that more diverse livelihood strategies are not necessarily associated with higher 
welfare. For example, rural households with salaried employment are almost always usually 
able to achieve higher levels of income than rural households that do casual work for their 
neighbours. Rural households that earn important shares of their livelihood through extraction 
of natural resources are usually among the poorest in their villages. 
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d) Thresholds in processing and marketing condition entry into higher-return value-adding 
activities post-harvest for rural households. Financing, scale of operation and infrastructure 
constraints may limit access to remunerative activities, such as bulk storage, cooling and 
pasteurization of milk in dairy cooperatives or horticultural products (e.g., fruits, vegetables, 
cut flowers) subjects to costly, strict international grades and standards enforcement.  In 
southwestern Morocco, Lybbert, Barrett and Narjisse (2002) found that access to electricity 
and finance segmented households between distinct markets that emerged for argan oil, with 
the high-end export market controlled by non-natives of the argan forest whose superior 
capital and electricity access enabled them to test, certify and package the oil for European 
markets in ways beyond the reach of poorer forest dwellers, who were stuck selling only to 
lower-value local markets.  
 
Asset risk and poverty traps 
Standard economic analysis of risk considers the effects of stochastic processes on the 
payoffs to particular strategies and attitudes toward variation in payoffs. The perspective of 
dynamic poverty traps adds another dimension to this analysis: reductions in asset stocks 
below key threshold levels may cause households to shift from higher return to lower return 
livelihood strategies.  
 
The poor tend to be much more exposed than the rich are to asset risk and thus face a higher 
probability of being cast below critical thresholds due to adverse shocks caused, for example, 
by drought, floods, hurricanes, infectious disease or war. This is true at the macro scale. For 
example, IFRCRCS (2002) reports that more than 98 percent of the people affected by 
different types of environmental (e.g., droughts, earthquakes, floods, avalanches) and 
technological (e.g., industrial or transport accidents) disasters worldwide, between 1992 and 
2001, lived in low and medium human development nations. It is also true at the micro scale. 
For example, Strauss and Thomas (1998) review a range of evidence showing that poorer 
people consistently suffer more episodes of illness than do the rich. Krishna et al. (2003) 
show that health shocks are by far the most common reason for households falling into 
poverty in Rajasthan, India, and western Kenya.  In the absence of effective safety nets to 
limit the damage done by asset shocks, people routinely fall not only into poverty, but beyond 
critical asset thresholds and into poverty traps.  
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Asset shocks are problematic not only because they occur, destroying personal and family 
capital by droughts, floods, hurricanes, wars, etc., but also because people follow 
precautionary strategies in order to try to avoid them. The existence of critical thresholds at 
which people switch between livelihood strategies heavily affects household risk 
management. Because households know (i) that asset shocks occur with positive probability 
(ii) that this probability is affected by current allocation decisions and (iii) that some asset 
shocks induce involuntary livelihoods transitions, people adapt their behaviors accordingly. 
They become more likely to choose activity and asset portfolios that limit asset and income 
risk, foregoing high-return investments that would demand significant short-term sacrifice 
beyond what is prudent and safe (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1993). They willingly 
destabilize consumption in order to protect assets so as to minimize the probability of 
suffering irreversible asset shocks in the next period (Zimmerman and Carter 2003, Barrett et 
al. 2003). The further they move beyond critical asset thresholds, the more they can begin to 
afford to undertake higher risk and higher return livelihood strategies, leading to locally 
increasing returns to assets.  
 
 
Implications for rural development policies  
Integration of the concepts of dynamic poverty traps and rural livelihoods raises several 
important implications for rural development policy as well.  We emphasize four in 
particular. 
 
Agricultural extension for poverty alleviation 
Extension services should distinguish client groups on the basis of livelihood strategies and 
asset portfolios, and consider how new technologies would fit into different strategies and 
how they might be limited or facilitated by different asset levels. For households that are 
relatively rich in land and labour, but poor in other assets and income generation potential, 
extension agents might focus on knowledge-intensive techniques that are not subject to 
threshold effects. For example, there is evidence from Zambia, Malawi and Kenya that access 
to information and germplasm are the most important constraints to the adoption of 
agroforestry approaches to soil fertility enhancement, even among relatively poor households 
and female headed households (Place et al., 2002; Gladwin et al., 2002).  
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Agricultural technology development 
Research on improved technologies typically focuses on expanding the yield frontier or on 
developing crop and animal varieties that can better resist abiotic or biotic stresses.  This is 
obviously desirable for those farming households that presently appear willing and able to 
employ frontier technologies.  But in many cases, households opt for seemingly inferior, 
earlier generation technologies, leaving “improved” seeds, machinery and methods on the 
shelf.  A key insight offered by the dynamic poverty traps approach is that the highest return 
technologies, at least in terms of welfare improvements among the poor, may come not from 
expansion of the agricultural production frontier so much as from creating and introducing 
“transition technologies” that are feasible and desirable to adopt now, but which naturally 
lead to accumulation and graduation to still-better technologies.  Technologies that increase 
returns to existing livelihood strategies can thus become avenues to new, more desirable, 
livelihood strategies that can be adopted in the future. 
 
Rural Financial Markets 
If poorer households could freely draw down cash savings or take out loans at reasonable 
interest rates or receive insurance payments on extraordinary losses, most problems of 
persistent poverty would vanish.  In poor communities, however, incomplete rural financial 
markets limit people’s ability to make trades across time and across states of nature so as to 
overcome the financing constraints that underpin poverty traps.  Limited access to finance 
severely limits uptake of improved technologies and investment in productive assets or 
activities offering high expected rates of return. Furthermore, the poor commonly have 
trouble weathering shocks, suffering either persistent or catastrophic health problems 
(Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001) or necessitating distress sales of valuable productive assets.  
Hence the push to extend microfinance, encompassing both savings and credit products for 
the poor (Zeller et al. 1997), and to provide novel forms of insurance against rainfall and 
other shocks (Skees 2000). 
 
Safety Nets 
The threat of uninsured asset loss and the possibility that unforeseen events can knock people 
into lower-level livelihood strategies underscore that safety nets can play an extremely 
valuable role in mitigating asset risk, in keeping short-term shocks from leading to chronic 
poverty through endogenous asset decumulation or low-return production and portfolio 
strategies.  There are examples of safety net schemes that seem to work, perhaps especially 
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those based on public employment guarantees, such as food-for-work programs, when 
designed and implemented properly (von Braun 1995, Ravallion 1999, Barrett, Holden and 
Clay 2003).  Food aid can likewise contribute to better consumption outcomes and 
anthropometric status and to the protection of crucial productive asset stocks (Quisumbing 
2003, Barrett and Maxwell forthcoming), although it largely fails to help move recipients out 
of chronic poverty. Rather, food aid prevents decline into deeper destitution. 
 
In sum, rural development policies need to emphasize both opening up pathways out of 
poverty for those seemingly trapped in chronic poverty – through improved access to 
transition technologies and to financial products – and to erect and maintain effective safety 
nets to keep the poor from being undercut by adverse shocks.  Extension services play a 
potentially valuable role in identifying distinct client groups on the basis of livelihood 
strategies and asset portfolios and thus in helping to target different policy interventions to 
communities and households with different needs. 
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Table 1:  Relations between assets, livelihoods and household incomes: 
Summary of results from previous studies from Africa 
Study sample Asset and correlation  Livelihood and 
correlation  
References 
Kenya 1994  
(~ 10,000 households) 
primary education (+), 
land holdings (ns)  
agriculture 
dependence (-) 
Geda et al. 
(2001) 
Uganda 2000 (315 
households in 3 districts) 
land holdings (+), 
livestock (+), productive 
tools (+) 
self employment (+) Ellis and 
Bahiigwa 
(2001) 
Zimbabwe 1995 (594 
households in 3 semi-arid 
districts) 
oxen (+) 
scotch carts (+), 
wheelbarrows (+), 
education (+) 
regular wages (+) Bird and 
Shepherd 
(2003) 
South Africa 1998 (1200 
households in KwaZulu 
Natal) 
arable land (+) 
family members (-)  
(not reported) Carter and May 
(2001) 
South Africa 1999 
(number of households not 
reported)  
(not reported) formal sector 
employment (+) 
Aliber (2003) 
Malawi 1998 (12,960 
households) 
education (+) agricultural 
land (+) livestock (+) 
distance to public 
services (-) 
formal sector 
employment (+), 
tobacco production 
(+ in one region, ns 
in one region) 
Mukherjee and 
Benson (2003) 
Ethiopia 1995 and 1996 
(2695 households) 
agricultural land (+) 
livestock (+) 
primary education (ns) 
secondary education (na) 
(not reported) Jayne et al. 
(2001) 
Kenya 1997 (1416 
households) 
agricultural land (+) 
livestock (+) 
primary education (+) 
secondary education (+) 
(not reported) Jayne et al. 
(2001) 
Zambia 1999 / 2000 (6330 
households) 
agricultural land (+) 
livestock (+) 
primary education (+) 
secondary education (+) 
(not reported) Jayne et al. 
(2001) 
Rwanda 1991 (1108 
households) 
agricultural land (+) 
livestock (+) 
primary education (+) 
secondary education (na) 
(not reported) Jayne et al. 
(2001) 
Mozambique 1996 (3851 
households) 
agricultural land (+) 
livestock (+) 
primary education (ns) 
secondary education (ns) 
(not reported) Jayne et al. 
(2001) 
(+) indicates positive impact on household income, (-) indicates a negative impact on 
household income, (ns) indicates no statistically significant impact on household income, (na) 
indicates not applicable 
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Figure 1: Income Orderings by
Livelihood Strategy in Rwanda
